This was the title of a symposium held in Moscow, May 27–30, 1986, and organized by the “International Association for the Study of Dialectical Philosophy—Societas Hegeliana,” in collaboration with the Institute for Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. Participation was by invitation only. Thirteen participants came from the Federal Republic of Germany, twelve from the U.S.S.R., six from the Democratic Republic of Germany, four each from France and Italy, two from Bulgaria, as well as one each from (...) Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Finland, Austria, Switzerland, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, and Canada. Papers had been distributed previously and were briefly summarized to allow for more lengthy discussions. The two languages used were Russian and German. Simultaneous translation was provided. (shrink)

Translations, especially of important texts, tend to be controversial. In a collaborative translation, the controversy will start during the process itself, and may persist until the end. In our case this is reflected in two translators’ introductions. Translators and reviewers agree or disagree on the basis of certain principles. There are, one could say, two “schools”: those in favor of more contextual choices of terminology, and those striving for strict consistency. The first will be more inclined to distinguish between “technical” (...) and “non-technical” uses of the same term, and consider this to be part of the translator’s role. The latter will try to avoid making these distinctions, and leave as much room as possible for the reader to decide. The first also tend to see the translation as standing on its own, readily intelligible to those who are without any knowledge of the original language. The latter intend to serve primarily readers who are interested in developing some, progressively better, knowledge of the text in its original language. They will attach more importance to an extensive glossary, which ideally should be applicable to the translated author’s entire corpus. (shrink)

To show that something is “possible” or “impossible” does not seem, for Hegel, to be a genuine concern for philosophy. In point of fact, “everything is possible,” because everything has the simple form of identity-with-itself, i.e., does not contradict itself, - and it is equally true that “everything is impossible,” because, in any concrete content, the determinacy can be taken as determined opposition and so as contradiction. Hegel therefore concludes that there is “no emptier talk” than that of such “possibilities” (...) and “impossibilities”. (shrink)